

Newark Public Schools
 United States History II Unit Overview
 “The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War”

Summative Assessment

Students will take an assessment analyzing primary and secondary source documents of the Cold War Era and write an argument citing evidence from those source documents in which they select and defend a position on who was primarily responsible for the Cold War.

Essential Questions

Enduring Understandings

What were the ideological differences and other factors that contributed to the Cold War?

-The U.S. policy of containment attempted to prevent the spread of communism.
 -Nuclear arms escalation in the U.S. and the USSR polarized many world nations into mutually supportive organizations.

Focus Questions

Week 1:
 What U.S. actions may have been considered aggressive resulting in the Cold War?

Week 2:
 What Soviet actions may have been considered aggressive resulting in the Cold War?

Week 3:
 What factors led to United States involvement in the Korean War?

Week 4:
 How was the Cuban Missile Crisis averted?

Week 5:
 Was the U.S. planning to go to war with North Vietnam before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution?

Week 6:
 Who was primarily responsible for the Cold War, the United States or the Soviet Union?

Learning Objectives

- Use historical thinking skills such as sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating to answer historical questions.
- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.
- Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content by introducing precise, knowledgeable claim(s), establishing the significance of the claim(s), distinguishing the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and creating an organization that logically sequences the claim(s), counterclaims, reasons, and evidence.

Examples of Content-Specific Vocabulary/Terms

Cold War	Communism	Containment
Nuclear proliferation	The Iron Curtain	The Truman Doctrine
Red China	SALT 1 Treaty	Bay of Pigs
Cuban Missile Crisis	United Nations	Security Council

Standards Alignment:

CCSS RH.10-11.1, RH.10-11.2, RH.10-11.3, RH.10-11.4, RH.10-11.5, RH.10-11.6, RH.10-11.7, RH.10-11.8, RH.10-11.9, RH.10-11.10, WHST.10-11.1, WHST.10-11.2, WHST.10-11.4, WHST.10-11.9
 NJCCCS 6.1.12.A.12.a, 6.1.12.A.12.b, 6.1.12.A.12.c, 6.1.12.B.12.a, 6.1.12.C.12.a, 6.1.12.C.12.c, 6.1.12.D.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.b, 6.1.12.D.12.c, 6.1.12.D.12.d, 6.1.12.D.12.e

The Post-War United States (1945- 1970) The Cold War

Unit Overview

Unit Rationale: In this unit, students gain an understanding for the issues, sacrifices, and concerns of Americans in the years following World War II. Students will investigate the issues that faced the United States and Soviet Union, including the Truman Doctrine, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War. First-person accounts, maps, speeches, and other primary and secondary source materials may be used to answer historical questions.

Historical Thinking:

The study of history rests on knowledge of facts, dates, names, places, events, and ideas. However, true historical understanding requires students to engage in historical thinking: to raise questions and to marshal solid evidence in support of their answers; to go beyond the facts presented in their textbooks and examine the historical record for themselves; to consult documents, journals, diaries, artifacts, historic sites, works of art, quantitative data, and other evidence from the past, and to do so imaginatively--taking into account the historical context in which these records were created and comparing the multiple points of view of those on the scene at the time.

“Facts are crucial to historical understanding, but there is only way for them to take root in memory: Facts are mastered by engaging students in historical questions that spark their curiosity and make them passionate about seeking answers.” (“Reading Like A Historian”, Wineburg, Martin, and Monte-Sano, Teachers College Press, New York, 2011.)

Four main skills help to facilitate historical understanding: sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating.

- **Sourcing**-Historians begin reading a document at the end by sourcing it. They glance at the first couple of words but then go immediately to the document’s attribution. Who wrote this source and when? Is it a diary entry? A memo obtained through the Freedom of Information Act? A leaked e-mail? Is the author in a position to know first-hand or this account based on hearsay? Sourcing transforms the act of reading from passive reception to engaged and active interrogation.
- **Contextualizing**-Contextualizing is the notion that events MUST be located in place and time to be properly understood.
- **Close Reading**-Primary and secondary sources provide students with an opportunity for close reading. They are the place to teach students to slow down and read closely, to think deeply about word choice and subtext.
- **Corroborating**-Corroborating is a strategy in which a reader asks questions about important details to determine points of agreement and disagreement. By comparing and contrasting multiple account, students can start to build a real understanding of what happened in the past and why.

Discipline Specific Literacy:

Research has shown that a key to literacy is exposing students to a rich diet of texts that mix genre and style “at a variety of difficulty levels and on a variety of topics.” Primary sources confront readers with varied styles and textures of language that push the boundaries of literacy.

Newark Public Schools
 United States History II
 “The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War”
 Week 1

Formative Assessment

Text dependent questions that follow the primary source document.

Focus Question

What U.S. actions may have been considered aggressive resulting in the Cold War?

Learning Objectives

- Use historical thinking skills such as sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating to answer historical questions.
- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.
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Possible Activities and Support

Hook Activity-“We Didn’t Start the Fire”-Print out copies of the lyrics from Billy Joel’s “We Didn’t Start the Fire”-Place students in groups to identify key terms related to the Cold War for each verse while playing the song from YouTube.
 Political Cartoon Analysis-Locate political cartoons from the era and ask students to analyze the symbolism of the cartoon as it pertains to the documents being reviewed.
 Document Analysis Forms from the National Archives to assist students in reading and analyzing the documents.
 Check for Understanding Activity- Read Novikov’s Telegram and using the SPRITE (Social, Political, Religious, Intellectual, Technological, Economic) analysis, write a paragraph outlining Novikov’s motivation for writing the telegram.

Content-Specific Vocabulary/Terms

Suggested Text(s)

Cold War
 Containment

Communism

Henry Wallace’s Letter to Truman “Achieving an Atmosphere of Mutual Trust and Confidence” (1946)
 Novikov’s Telegram Regarding American Postwar Behavior (1946)

Standards Alignment:

CCSS RH.10-11.1, RH.10-11.2, RH.10-11.3, RH.10-11.4, RH.10-11.5, RH.10-11.6, RH.10-11.7, RH.10-11.8, RH.10-11.9, RH.10-11.10, WHST.10-11.1, WHST.10-11.2, WHST.10-11.4, WHST.10-11.9
 NJCCCS 6.1.12.A.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.a

The Post-War United States (1945- 1970) The Cold War

Week 1 Overview

Learning Objective: The goal of this week long plan is to give students the opportunity to explore the point of view of one of Truman’s cabinet members who was critical of American foreign policy. Allies during World War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union disagreed over a number of issues after the war including control of Eastern Europe, division of Germany, atomic energy, international loans, and the Middle East. On February 9, 1946, Soviet premier Josef Stalin asserted that the continued existence of capitalism in the West would inevitably lead to war. Foreign Service senior diplomat George Kennan sent President Harry Truman, still forming a Soviet policy, a lengthy telegram advocating containment. Commerce Secretary Henry A. Wallace was one of the few liberal idealists in Truman’s cabinet. Wallace envisioned a “century of the common man” marked by global peace and prosperity. In the following excerpt from a letter dated July 23, 1946, Wallace urged Truman to build “mutual trust and confidence” in order to achieve “an enduring international order.” Truman asked Wallace to resign. By reading and rereading the passage closely, combined with classroom discussion about it, students will explore the various beliefs and points of view Wallace expresses as he became critical of the actions of the United States. Students will need to consider the emotional context of words and how diction (word choice) affects an author’s message. When combined with writing about the passage and teacher feedback, students will form a deeper understanding of how politics played a role in U.S. foreign policy.

Reading Task: Students will silently read the passage in question on a given day—first independently and then following along with the text as the teacher and/or skillful students read aloud. Depending on the difficulties of a given text and the teacher’s knowledge of the fluency abilities of students, the order of the student silent read and the teacher reading aloud with students following might be reversed. What is important is to allow all students to interact with challenging text on their own as frequently and independently as possible. Students will then reread specific passages in response to a set of concise, text-dependent questions that compel them to examine the meaning and structure of Wallace’s letter. Therefore, rereading is deliberately built into the instructional unit.

Vocabulary Task: Most of the meanings of words in the exemplar text can be discovered by students from careful reading of the context in which they appear. Teachers can use discussions to model and reinforce how to learn vocabulary from contextual clues, and students must be held accountable for engaging in this practice.

Sentence Syntax Task: On occasion students will encounter particularly difficult sentences to decode. Teachers should engage in a close examination of such sentences to help students discover how they are built and how they convey meaning. While many questions addressing important aspects of the text double as questions about syntax, students should receive regular supported practice in deciphering complex sentences. It is crucial that the help they receive in unpacking text complexity focuses both on the precise meaning of what the author is saying and why the author might have constructed the sentence in this particular fashion. That practice will in turn support students’ ability to unpack meaning from syntactically complex sentences they encounter in future reading.

Discussion Task: Students will discuss the exemplar text in depth with their teacher and their classmates, performing activities that result in a close reading of Wallace’s letter. The goal is to foster student confidence when encountering complex text and to reinforce the skills they have acquired regarding how to build and extend their understanding of a text. A general principle is to always reread the passage that provides evidence for the question under discussion. This gives students another encounter with the text, helping them develop fluency and reinforcing their use of text evidence.

Writing Task: Students will write an explanatory paragraph using their understanding of the word choice and emotions expressed in the selection to present their opinions about what Wallace is trying to explain. Teachers might afford students the opportunity to revise their paragraphs after participating in classroom discussion or receiving teacher feedback, allowing them to refashion both their understanding of the text and their expression of that understanding.

Outline of Lesson Plan: This lesson can be delivered in a week of instruction and reflection on the part of students and their teacher.

Summary of Close Reading Activities

Day One:

Teacher introduces the day's passage with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 1-15 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Two:

Teacher introduces the day's passage with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 16-25 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Three:

Teacher introduces the day's passage with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 26-29 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Four:

Socratic seminars are named for their embodiment of Socrates' belief in the power of asking questions, prize inquiry over information and discussion over debate. Socratic seminars acknowledge the highly social nature of learning and align with the work of John Dewey, Lev Vygotsky, Jean Piaget, and Paulo Friere.

Elfie Israel succinctly defines Socratic seminars and implies their rich benefits for students:

The Socratic seminar is a formal discussion, based on the text, in which the leader asks open-ended questions. Within the context of the discussion, students listen closely to the comments of others, thinking critically for themselves, and articulate their own thoughts and their responses to the thoughts of others. They learn to work cooperatively and to question intelligently and civilly. (89)

Israel, Elfie. "Examining Multiple Perspectives in Literature." In Inquiry and the Literary Text: Constructing Discussions in the English Classroom. James Holden and John S. Schmit, eds. Urbana, IL: NCTE, 2002.

In a Socratic Seminar, the participants carry the burden of responsibility for the quality of the discussion. Good discussions occur when participants study the text closely in advance, listen actively, share their ideas and questions in response to the ideas and questions of others, and search for evidence in the text to support their ideas. The discussion is not about right answers; it is not a debate. Students are encouraged to think out loud and to exchange ideas openly while examining ideas in a rigorous, thoughtful, manner.

Day Five:

Teacher then assigns a culminating writing assignment that asks students to synthesize the entire reading such as:

Examine U.S. actions following World War II and citing evidence from the text evaluate Wallace's statement concerning other nation's views that the United States was merely "paying lip service" to peace.

“Achieving an Atmosphere of Mutual Trust and Confidence”: Henry A. Wallace Offers an Alternative to Cold War Containment

July 23, 1946
The President
The White House

My Dear Mr. President:

I hope you will excuse this long letter. Personally I hate to write long letters, and I hate to receive them.

My only excuse is that this subject is a very important one—probably the most important in the world today. I checked with you about this last Thursday and you suggested after Cabinet meeting on Friday that you would like to have my views.

I have been increasingly disturbed about the trend of international affairs since the end of the war, and I am even more troubled by the apparently growing feeling among the American people that another war is coming and the only way that we can head it off is to arm ourselves to the teeth. Yet all of past history indicates that an armaments race does not lead to peace but to war. The months just ahead may well be the crucial period which will decide whether the civilized world will go down in destruction after the five or ten years needed for several nations to arm themselves with atomic bombs. Therefore, I want to give you my views on how the present trend toward conflict might be averted. . . .

How do American actions since V-J Day appear to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like \$13 billion for the War and Navy Departments, the Bikini tests of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our weapons, production of B-29s and planned production of B-36s, and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at the conference table.

These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coastlines, and we did not?

Some of the military men and self-styled “realists” are saying: “What’s wrong with trying to build up a predominance of force? The only way to preserve peace is for this country to be so well armed that no one will dare attack us. We know that America will never start a war.”

The flaw in this policy is simply that it will not work. In a world of atomic bombs and other revolutionary new weapons, such as radioactive poison gases and biological warfare, a peace maintained by a predominance of force is no longer possible.

Why is this so? The reasons are clear:

FIRST. Atomic warfare is cheap and easy compared with old-fashioned war. Within a very few years several countries can have atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. Compared with the cost of large armies and the manufacture of old-fashioned weapons, atomic bombs cost very little and require only a relatively small part of a nation’s production plant and labor force.

SECOND. So far as winning a war is concerned, having more bombs—even many more bombs—than the other fellow is no longer a decisive advantage. If another nation had enough bombs to eliminate all of our principal cities and our heavy industry, it wouldn’t help us very much if we had ten times as many bombs as we needed to do the same to them.

THIRD. And most important, the very fact that several nations have atomic bombs will inevitably result in a neurotic, fear-ridden, itching-trigger psychology in all the peoples of the world, and because of our wealth and vulnerability we

would be among the most seriously affected. Atomic war will not require vast and time-consuming preparations, the mobilization of large armies, the conversion of a large proportion of a country's industrial plants to the manufacture of weapons. In a world armed with atomic weapons, some incident will lead to the use of those weapons.

There is a school of military thinking which recognizes these facts, recognizes that when several nations have atomic bombs, a war which will destroy modern civilization will result and that no nation or combination of nations can win such a war. This school of thought therefore advocates a "preventive war," an attack on Russia *now* before Russia has atomic bombs.

This scheme is not only immoral, but stupid. If we should attempt to destroy all the principal Russian cities and her heavy industry, we might well succeed. But the immediate countermeasure which such an attack would call forth is the prompt occupation of all Continental Europe by the Red Army. Would we be prepared to destroy the cities of all Europe in trying to finish what we had started? This idea is so contrary to all the basic instincts and principles of the American people that any such action would be possible only under a dictatorship at home. . . .

In general there are two overall points of view which can be taken in approaching the problem of the United States-Russian relations. The first is that it is not possible to get along with the Russians and therefore war is inevitable. The second is that war with Russia would bring catastrophe to all mankind, and therefore we must find a way of living in peace. It is clear that our own welfare as well as that of the entire world requires that we maintain the latter point of view. I am sure that this is also your opinion, and the radio address of the Secretary of State on July 15 clearly indicates that he is prepared to negotiate as long as may be necessary to work out a solution on this basis.

We should try to get an honest answer to the question of what the factors are which cause Russia to distrust us, in addition to the question of what factors lead us to distrust Russia. I am not sure that we have as a nation or an Administration found an adequate answer to either question, although we have recognized that both questions are of critical importance.

FACTORS IN AMERICAN DISTRUST OF RUSSIA

Our basic distrust of the Russians, which has been greatly intensified in recent months by the playing up of conflict in the press, stems from differences in political and economic organization. For the first time in our history defeatists among us have raised the fear of another system as a successful rival to democracy and free enterprise in other countries and perhaps even our own. I am convinced that we can meet that challenge as we have in the past by demonstrating that economic abundance can be achieved without sacrificing personal, political and religious liberties. We cannot meet it as Hitler tried to by an anti-Comintern alliance.

It is perhaps too easy to forget that despite the deep-seated differences in our cultures and intensive anti-Russian propaganda of some twenty-five years standing, the American people reversed their attitudes during the crisis of war. Today, under the pressure of seemingly insoluble international problems and continuing deadlocks, the tide of American public opinion is again turning against Russia. In this reaction lies one of the dangers to which this letter is addressed.

FACTORS IN RUSSIAN DISTRUST OF THE WESTERN WORLD

I should list the factors which make for Russian distrust of the United States and of the Western world as follows: The first is Russian history, which we must take into account because it is the setting in which Russians see all actions and policies of the rest of the world. Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest—by the Mongols, the Turks, the Swedes, the Germans and the Poles. The scant thirty years of the existence of the Soviet Government has in Russian eyes been a continuation of their historical struggle for national existence. The first four years of the new regime, from 1917 through 1921, were spent in resisting attempts at destruction by the Japanese, British and French, with some American assistance, and by the several White Russian armies encouraged and financed by the Western powers. Then, in 1941, the Soviet State was almost conquered by the Germans after a period during which the Western European powers had apparently acquiesced in the rearming of Germany in the belief that the Nazis would seek to expand eastward rather than westward. The Russians, therefore, obviously see themselves as fighting for their existence in a hostile world.

Second, it follows that to the Russians all of the defense and security measures of the Western powers seem to have an aggressive intent. Our actions to expand our military security system—such steps as extending the Monroe Doctrine to include the arming of the Western Hemisphere nations, our present monopoly of the atomic bomb, our interest in outlying bases and our general support of the British Empire—appear to them as going far beyond the requirements of defense. I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world, and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history. From the Russian point of view, also, the granting of a loan to Britain and the lack of tangible results on their request to borrow for rehabilitation purposes may be regarded as another evidence of strengthening of an anti-Soviet bloc.

Finally, our resistance to her attempts to obtain warmwater ports and her own security system in the form of “friendly” neighboring states seems, from the Russian point of view, to clinch the case. After twenty-five years of isolation and after having achieved the status of a major power, Russia believes that she is entitled to recognition of her new status. Our interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy by and large has never existed, seems to her an attempt to reestablish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors which was created after the last war and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her.

WHAT WE SHOULD DO

If this analysis is correct, and there is ample evidence to support it, the action to improve the situation is clearly indicated. The fundamental objective of such action should be to allay any reasonable Russian grounds for fear, suspicion and distrust. We must recognize that the world has changed and that today there can be no “one world” unless the United States and Russia can find some way of living together. For example, most of us are firmly convinced of the soundness of our position when we suggest the internationalization and defortification of the Danube or of the Dardanelles, but we would be horrified and angered by any Russian counter-proposal that would involve also the internationalizing and disarming of Suez or Panama. We must recognize that to the Russians these seem to be identical situations.

We should ascertain from a fresh point of view what Russia believes to be essential to her own security as a prerequisite to the writing of the peace and to cooperation in the construction of a world order. We should be prepared to judge her requirements against the background of what we ourselves and the British have insisted upon as essential to our respective security. We should be prepared, even at the expense of risking epithets of appeasement, to agree to reasonable Russian guarantees of security. . . .

We should be prepared to negotiate a treaty which will establish a definite sequence of events for the establishment of international control and development of atomic energy. This, I believe, is the most important single question, and the one on which the present trend is definitely toward deadlock rather than ultimate agreement.

We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications. The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda. Several religious doctrines, all claiming to be the only true gospel and salvation, have existed side by side with a reasonable degree of tolerance for centuries. This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated by absolutist governments.

We should not act as if we too felt that we were threatened in today’s world. We are by far the most powerful nation in the world, the only Allied nation which came out of the war without devastation and much stronger than before the war. Any talk on our part about the need for strengthening our defenses further is bound to appear hypocritical to other nations.

SUMMARY

This proposal admittedly calls for a shift in some of our thinking about international matters. It is imperative that we make this shift. We have little time to lose. Our postwar actions have not yet been adjusted to the lessons to be gained from experience of Allied cooperation during the war and the facts of the atomic age.

It is certainly desirable that, as far as possible, we achieve unity on the home front with respect to our international relations; but unity on the basis of building up conflict abroad would prove to be not only unsound but disastrous. I think

there is some reason to fear that in our earnest efforts to achieve bi-partisan unity in this country we may have given way too much to isolationism masquerading as tough realism in international affairs.

The real test lies in the achievement of international unity. It will be fruitless to continue to seek solutions for the many specific problems that face us in the making of the peace and in the establishment of an enduring international order without first achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. The task admittedly is not an easy one. There is no question, as the Secretary of State has indicated, that negotiations with the Russians are difficult because of cultural differences, their traditional isolationism, and their insistence on a visible quid pro quo in all agreements. But the task is not an insuperable one if we take into account that to other nations our foreign policy consists not only of the principles that we advocate but of the actions we take. Fundamentally, this comes down to the point discussed earlier in this letter, that even our own security, in the sense that we have known it in the past, cannot be preserved by military means in a world armed with atomic weapons. The only type of security which can be maintained by our own military force is the type described by a military man before the Senate Atomic Energy Commission—a security against invasion after all our cities and perhaps 40 million of our city population have been destroyed by atomic weapons. That is the best that “security” on the basis of armaments has to offer us. It is not the kind of security that our people and the people of the other United Nations are striving for.

I think that progressive leadership along the lines suggested above would represent and best serve the interests of the large majority of our people, would reassert the forward looking position of the Democratic Party in international affairs, and, finally, would arrest the new trend towards isolationism and a disastrous atomic world war.

Respectfully,

[Signed] H. A. Wallace

Source: Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace to President Harry S. Truman, July 23, 1946, in Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

Text Dependent Questions:

Day 1

1. What does Wallace state is his purpose in writing this letter?
2. Why does Wallace believe that “the months just ahead may well be the crucial period”?
3. What actions taken by the U.S. did Wallace state accounted for why the U.S. was viewed as being the aggressor?
4. What reasons did Wallace give for why a show of predominant force as the only to preserve peace was a flawed view?
5. Why does Wallace say, “This scheme is not only immoral, but stupid”?

Day 2

6. Why, according to the author, did Americans distrust the Soviet Union?
7. What system of government does Wallace refer to when he speaks of a “rival to democracy and free enterprise”?
8. Why, according to the author, did the Soviet Union distrust the United States?
9. Why does Wallace believe it is important to cite Russian history as a factor in Russian distrust of the Western World?
10. What does Wallace mean when he discusses “extending the Monroe Doctrine to include the arming of the Western Hemisphere nations”?
11. What were the Wallace's recommendations for how U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union ought to be conducted?

Day 3

12. What does Wallace mean when he states we must “achieve unity on the homefront with respect to our international relations”?
13. What is the fear Wallace refers to when he says, “we may have given way too much to isolationism masquerading as tough realism”?
14. What was the “real test” toward better U.S.-Soviet relations, according to Wallace, and would be the obstacles to attain it?
15. What does Wallace mean when he states the Russians insist on a “visible quid pro quo in all agreements”?
16. What impact did Wallace's letter make on the Truman administration?

Excerpt from the “Novikov Telegram” Regarding American Postwar Behavior

Nikolai Novikov

September 1946

The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies..is characterized in the postwar period by a striving for world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles: that the United States has the right to lead the world. All the forces of American diplomacy-the army, the air force, the navy, industry, and science-are enlisted in the service of this foreign policy. For this purpose broad plans for expansion have been developed and are being implemented through diplomacy and the establishment of a system of naval and air bases stretching far beyond the boundaries of the United States, through the arms race, and through the creation of ever newer types of weapons....

Europe has come out of the war with a completely dislocated economy, and the economic devastation that occurred in the course of the war cannot be overcome in a short time. All of the countries of Europe and Asia are experiencing a colossal need for consumer goods, industrial and transportation equipment, etc. Such a situation provides American monopolistic capital with prospects for enormous shipments of goods and the importation of capital into these countries a circumstance that would permit it to infiltrate their national economies. Such a development would mean a serious strengthening of the economic position of the United States in the whole world and would be a stage on the road to world domination by the United States .On the other hand, we have seen a failure of calculations on the part of U.S. circles which assumed that the Soviet Union would be destroyed in the war or would come out of it so weakened that it would be forced to go begging to the United States for economic assistance. Had that happened, they would have been able to dictate conditions permitting the United States to carry out its expansion in Europe and Asia without hindrance from the USSR. In actuality, despite all of the economic difficulties of the post-war period connected with the enormous losses inflicted by the war and the German fascist occupation, the Soviet Union continues to remain economically independent of the outside world and is re-building its national economy with its own forces....

The enormous relative weight of the USSR in international affairs in general and in the European countries in particular, the in-dependence of its foreign policy, and the economic and political assistance that it provides to neighboring countries, both allies and former enemies, has led to the growth of the political influence of the Soviet Union in these countries and to the further strengthening of democratic tendencies in them. Such a situation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe cannot help but be regarded by the American imperialists as an obstacle in the path of the expansionist policy of the United States. The foreign policy of the United States is not determined at pre-sent by the circles in the Democratic party that (as was the case during Roosevelt’s lifetime) strive to strengthen the cooperation of the three great powers that constituted the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition during the war. The ascendance to power of President Truman, a politically unstable person but with certain conservative tendencies, and the subsequent appointment of Byrnes as Secretary of State meant a strengthening of the influence on U.S. foreign policy of the most reactionary circles of the Democratic party.... Obvious indications of the U.S. effort to establish world dominance are also to be found in the increase in military potential in peacetime and in the establishment of a large number of naval and air bases both in the United States and beyond its borders....

All of these facts show clearly that a decisive role in the realization of plans for world dominance by the United States is played by its armed forces.... The ruling circles of the United States obviously have a sympathetic attitude toward the idea of a military alliance with England, but at the present time the

matter has not yet culminated in an official alliance. Churchill's speech in Fulton calling for the conclusion of an Anglo-American military alliance for the purpose of establishing joint domination over the world was therefore not supported officially by Truman or Byrnes, although Truman by his presence did indirectly sanction Churchill's appeal. Even if the United States does not go so far as to conclude a military alliance with England just now, in practice they still maintain very close contact on military questions... The numerous and extremely hostile statements by American government, political, and military figures with regard to the Soviet Union and its foreign policy are very characteristic of the current relationship between the ruling circles of the United States and the USSR. These statements are echoed in an even more unrestrained tone by the overwhelming majority of the American press organs.

Talk about a "third war," meaning a war against the Soviet Union, even a direct call for this war with the threat of using the atomic bomb such is the content of the statements on relations with the Soviet Union by reactionaries at public meetings and in the press... The basic goal of this anti-Soviet campaign of American "public opinion" is to exert political pressure on the Soviet Union and compel it to make concessions. Another, no less important goal of the campaign is the attempt to create an atmosphere of war psychosis among the masses, who are weary of war, thus making it easier for the U.S. government to carry out measures for the maintenance of high military potential. It was in this very atmosphere that the law on universal military service in peacetime was passed by congress, that the huge military budget was adopted, and that plans are being worked out for the construction of an extensive system of naval and air bases. Of course, all of these measures for maintaining a highly military potential are not goals in themselves. They are only intended to prepare the conditions for winning world supremacy in a new war, the date for which, to be sure, cannot be determined now by anyone, but which is contemplated by the most bellicose circles of American imperialism.

Careful note should be taken of the fact that the preparation by the United States for a future is being conducted with the prospect of war against the Soviet Union, which in the eyes of the American imperialists is the main obstacle in the path of the United States to world domination. This is indicated by facts such as the tactical training of the American army for war with the Soviet Union as the future opponent, the siting of American strategic bases in regions from which it is possible to launch strikes on Soviet territory, intensified training and strengthening of Arctic regions as close approaches to the USSR, and attempts to prepare Germany and Japan to use those countries in a war against the USSR.

Source: Novikov, Nikolai V. Cold War Reference Library, Vol. 5, 2004. Excerpt from the "Novikov Telegram," September 27, 1946. Available at Cold War International History Project (Web site)

Newark Public Schools
 United States History II
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 Week 2

Formative Assessment

Text dependent questions that follow the primary source document.

Focus Question

What Soviet actions may have been considered aggressive resulting in the Cold War?

Learning Objectives

- Use historical thinking skills such as sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating to answer historical questions.
- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.
- Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content by introducing precise, knowledgeable claim(s), establishing the significance of the claim(s), distinguishing the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and creating an organization that logically sequences the claim(s), counterclaims, reasons, and evidence.

Possible Activities and Support

Download the mp3 file of Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain Speech” (1946) from <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/winstonchurchillsinewsofpeace.htm> and play for students asking them questions regarding Churchill’s speech
 Political Cartoon Analysis-Locate political cartoons from the era and ask students to analyze the symbolism of the cartoon as it pertains to the documents being reviewed.
 Document Analysis Forms from the National Archives to assist students in reading and analyzing the documents.

Content-Specific Vocabulary/Terms

Suggested Text(s)

Cold War
 Containment
 The Iron Curtain
 The Marshall Plan
 Communism
 The Truman Doctrine
 NATO

The Truman Doctrine (1947)

Standards Alignment:

CCSS RH.10-11.1, RH.10-11.2, RH.10-11.3, RH.10-11.4, RH.10-11.5, RH.10-11.6, RH.10-11.7, RH.10-11.8, RH.10-11.9, RH.10-11.10, WHST.10-11.1, WHST.10-11.2, WHST.10-11.4, WHST.10-11.9
 NJCCCS 6.1.12.A.12.a, 6.1.12.B.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.a

The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War

Week 2 Overview

Learning Objective: The goal of this week long plan is to give students the opportunity to explore the point of view of President Harry Truman. In March 1947, Truman asked Congress for money “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Thus articulated, the “Truman Doctrine” of containment served as the rationale for future American Cold War foreign policy initiatives. By reading and rereading the passage closely, combined with classroom discussion about it, students will explore the various beliefs and points of view expressed in The Truman Doctrine. Students will need to consider the emotional context of words and how diction (word choice) affects an author’s message. When combined with writing about the passage and teacher feedback, students will form a deeper understanding of how politics played a role in U.S. foreign policy.

Reading Task: Students will silently read the passage in question on a given day—first independently and then following along with the text as the teacher and/or skillful students read aloud. Depending on the difficulties of a given text and the teacher’s knowledge of the fluency abilities of students, the order of the student silent read and the teacher reading aloud with students following might be reversed. What is important is to allow all students to interact with challenging text on their own as frequently and independently as possible. Students will then reread specific passages in response to a set of concise, text-dependent questions that compel them to examine the meaning and structure of the presidential address. Therefore, rereading is deliberately built into the instructional unit.

Vocabulary Task: Most of the meanings of words in the exemplar text can be discovered by students from careful reading of the context in which they appear. Teachers can use discussions to model and reinforce how to learn vocabulary from contextual clues, and students must be held accountable for engaging in this practice.

Sentence Syntax Task: On occasion students will encounter particularly difficult sentences to decode. Teachers should engage in a close examination of such sentences to help students discover how they are built and how they convey meaning. While many questions addressing important aspects of the text double as questions about syntax, students should receive regular supported practice in deciphering complex sentences. It is crucial that the help they receive in unpacking text complexity focuses both on the precise meaning of what the author is saying and why the author might have constructed the sentence in this particular fashion. That practice will in turn support students’ ability to unpack meaning from syntactically complex sentences they encounter in future reading.

Discussion Task: Students will discuss the exemplar text in depth with their teacher and their classmates, performing activities that result in a close reading of Wallace’s letter. The goal is to foster student confidence when encountering complex text and to reinforce the skills they have acquired regarding how to build and extend their understanding of a text. A general principle is to always reread the passage that provides evidence for the question under discussion. This gives students another encounter with the text, helping them develop fluency and reinforcing their use of text evidence.

Writing Task: Students will write an explanatory paragraph using their understanding of the word choice and emotions expressed in the selection to present their opinions about what Truman is trying to convey. Teachers might afford students the opportunity to revise their paragraphs after participating in classroom discussion or receiving teacher feedback, allowing them to refashion both their understanding of the text and their expression of that understanding.

Outline of Lesson Plan: This lesson can be delivered in a week of instruction and reflection on the part of students and their teacher.

Summary of Close Reading Activities

Day One:

Teacher introduces the day's passage with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 1-13 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Two:

Teacher introduces the day's passage with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 14-23 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Three:

Teacher introduces the day's passage with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 24-30 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Four:

Socratic seminars are named for their embodiment of Socrates' belief in the power of asking questions, prize inquiry over information and discussion over debate. Socratic seminars acknowledge the highly social nature of learning and align with the work of John Dewey, Lev Vygotsky, Jean Piaget, and Paulo Friere.

Elfie Israel succinctly defines Socratic seminars and implies their rich benefits for students:

The Socratic seminar is a formal discussion, based on the text, in which the leader asks open-ended questions. Within the context of the discussion, students listen closely to the comments of others, thinking critically for themselves, and articulate their own thoughts and their responses to the thoughts of others. They learn to work cooperatively and to question intelligently and civilly. (89)

Israel, Elfie. "Examining Multiple Perspectives in Literature." In Inquiry and the Literary Text: Constructing Discussions in the English Classroom. James Holden and John S. Schmit, eds. Urbana, IL: NCTE, 2002.

In a Socratic Seminar, the participants carry the burden of responsibility for the quality of the discussion. Good discussions occur when participants study the text closely in advance, listen actively, share their ideas and questions in response to the ideas and questions of others, and search for evidence in the text to support their ideas. The discussion is not about right answers; it is not a debate. Students are encouraged to think out loud and to exchange ideas openly while examining ideas in a rigorous, thoughtful, manner.

Day Five:

Teacher then assigns a culminating writing assignment that asks students to synthesize the entire reading such as: Evaluate Truman's claims of Soviet aggression during the Cold War and how the Truman Doctrine impacted U.S.-Soviet relations during this period.

Transcript of Truman Doctrine (1947)

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife. When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications, and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry, and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.

Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery.

The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other. Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.

The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.

The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.

It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.

No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents eighty-five per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.

The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations. To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East. Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence. Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the \$350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized. If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work together. This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed \$341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

Transcription courtesy of [the Avalon Project](#) at Yale Law School.

Text Dependent Questions:

Day 1

1. Truman addressed a “joint session” of Congress regarding the crisis. What is a joint session of Congress?
2. What does Truman state is his purpose in this address to Congress?
3. What evidence did Truman give to suggest that Greece was in extreme need of assistance?
4. Give examples of how Truman describes the insurgents who wanted to overthrow the Greek government and replace it with a communist regime.
5. What reasoning did Truman use to convince his listeners that economic aid would help to prevent the spread of communism?
6. Why did Truman recommend the United States take on the financial responsibility of aiding Greece rather than having Great Britain or the United Nations do so?

Day 2

7. Truman also made note of the situation in Turkey. According to Truman, how was the situation in Turkey different from that in Greece? In what ways was it the same?
8. What are the implications of aiding Greece and Turkey, according to Truman?
9. In his address, Truman noted that “every nation must choose between alternative ways of live. The choice is too often not a free one.” What choices does Truman describe?
10. Truman notes, “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe we must assist free people to work out their own destinies in their own way.” How did Truman suggest the U.S. should assist nations to achieve this goal?
11. What are the first and second “ways of life” that Truman refers to?
12. What did Truman mean when he said, “The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred”?
13. According to Truman, why is the “survival and integrity of the Greek nation of grave importance in a much wider situation”?

Day 3

14. What specific aid from Congress is Truman requesting for Greece and Turkey?
15. Why does Truman call this aid “an investment in world freedom and world peace”?
16. What “spreads and grows in the evil soil of poverty and strife” according to Truman? Why does his use this metaphor?
17. In his speech, Truman noted that “If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world-and we will surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.” In your own words, describe what you think Truman meant by that statement.
18. Does Truman present American policy as offensive or defensive? What words or phrases does Truman use to present policy this way?
19. What aspects of this speech suggest that the Truman Doctrine could become part of a global strategy, with implications going far beyond Greece and Turkey?

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 Week 3

Formative Assessment

Text dependent questions that follow the primary source document.

Focus Question

What factors led to United States involvement in the Korean War?

Learning Objectives

- Use historical thinking skills such as sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating to answer historical questions.
- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.
- Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content by introducing precise, knowledgeable claim(s), establishing the significance of the claim(s), distinguishing the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and creating an organization that logically sequences the claim(s), counterclaims, reasons, and evidence.

Possible Activities and Support

Political Cartoon Analysis-Locate political cartoons from the era and ask students to analyze the symbolism of the cartoon as it pertains to the documents being reviewed.
 Document Analysis Forms from the National Archives to assist students in reading and analyzing the documents.

Content-Specific Vocabulary/Terms

Suggested Text(s)

Red China
 Kremlin
 National Security Council
 UN Security Council

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (1950)
 UN Security Council Resolution 83 (1950)

Standards Alignment:

CCSS RH.10-11.1, RH.10-11.2, RH.10-11.3, RH.10-11.4, RH.10-11.5, RH.10-11.6, RH.10-11.7, RH.10-11.8, RH.10-11.9, RH.10-11.10, WHST.10-11.1, WHST.10-11.2, WHST.10-11.4, WHST.10-11.9
 NJCCCS 6.1.12.A.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.c

The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War

Week 3 Overview

Learning Objective: The goal of this week long plan is to give students the opportunity to examine National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68), a formerly-classified report issued by the United States National Security Council on April 14, 1950, during the presidency of Harry S. Truman. Written during the formative stage of the Cold War, it was top secret until the 1970s when it was made public. It was one of the most significant statements of American policy in the Cold War. NSC-68 largely shaped U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War for the next 20 years. Students will also look at UN Security Council Resolution 83 issued in June, 1950. By reading and rereading the passages closely, combined with classroom discussion about it, students will explore the historical question of the factors that led to United States involvement in the Korean War. Students will need to consider the emotional context of words and how diction (word choice) affects an author's message. When combined with writing about the passage and teacher feedback, students will form a deeper understanding of the shaping of U.S. foreign policy during this era.

Reading Task: Students will silently read the passage in question on a given day—first independently and then following along with the text as the teacher and/or skillful students read aloud. Depending on the difficulties of a given text and the teacher's knowledge of the fluency abilities of students, the order of the student silent read and the teacher reading aloud with students following might be reversed. What is important is to allow all students to interact with challenging text on their own as frequently and independently as possible. Students will then reread specific passages in response to a set of concise, text-dependent questions that compel them to examine the meaning and structure of the presidential address. Therefore, rereading is deliberately built into the instructional unit.

Vocabulary Task: Most of the meanings of words in the exemplar text can be discovered by students from careful reading of the context in which they appear. Teachers can use discussions to model and reinforce how to learn vocabulary from contextual clues, and students must be held accountable for engaging in this practice.

Sentence Syntax Task: On occasion students will encounter particularly difficult sentences to decode. Teachers should engage in a close examination of such sentences to help students discover how they are built and how they convey meaning. While many questions addressing important aspects of the text double as questions about syntax, students should receive regular supported practice in deciphering complex sentences. It is crucial that the help they receive in unpacking text complexity focuses both on the precise meaning of what the author is saying and why the author might have constructed the sentence in this particular fashion. That practice will in turn support students' ability to unpack meaning from syntactically complex sentences they encounter in future reading.

Discussion Task: Students will discuss the exemplar text in depth with their teacher and their classmates, performing activities that result in a close reading of NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (1950) and UN Security Council Resolution 83 (1950). The goal is to foster student confidence when encountering complex text and to reinforce the skills they have acquired regarding how to build and extend their understanding of a text. A general principle is to always reread the passage that provides evidence for the question under discussion. This gives students another encounter with the text, helping them develop fluency and reinforcing their use of text evidence.

Writing Task: Students will write an explanatory paragraph using their understanding of the word choice and emotions expressed in the selection to present their opinions about what the documents were trying to convey. Teachers might afford students the opportunity to revise their paragraphs after participating in classroom discussion or receiving teacher feedback, allowing them to refashion both their understanding of the text and their expression of that understanding.

Outline of Lesson Plan: This lesson can be delivered in a week of instruction and reflection on the part of students and their teacher.

Summary of Close Reading Activities

Day One:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (NSC-68) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 1-36 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Two:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (NSC-68) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 36-70 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Three:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (Resolution 83) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Four:

Socratic seminars are named for their embodiment of Socrates' belief in the power of asking questions, prize inquiry over information and discussion over debate. Socratic seminars acknowledge the highly social nature of learning and align with the work of John Dewey, Lev Vygotsky, Jean Piaget, and Paulo Friere.

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Israel, Elfie. "Examining Multiple Perspectives in Literature." In Inquiry and the Literary Text: Constructing Discussions in the English Classroom. James Holden and John S. Schmit, eds. Urbana, IL: NCTE, 2002.

In a Socratic Seminar, the participants carry the burden of responsibility for the quality of the discussion. Good discussions occur when participants study the text closely in advance, listen actively, share their ideas and questions in response to the ideas and questions of others, and search for evidence in the text to support their ideas. The discussion is not about right answers; it is not a debate. Students are encouraged to think out loud and to exchange ideas openly while examining ideas in a rigorous, thoughtful, manner.

Day Five:

Teacher then assigns a culminating writing assignment that asks students to synthesize the entire reading such as: Was the Korean War a successful example of Containment?

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security

(April 14, 1950)

*A Report to the President
Pursuant to the President's Directive
of January 31, 1950*

TOP SECRET

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads:

That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.

The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part:

It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudices the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R.

ANALYSIS

I. Background of the Present Crisis

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.

II. Fundamental Purpose of the United States

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of ideas and Values between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design

A. NATURE OF CONFLICT

The Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the conflict between idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin, which has come to a crisis with the polarization of power described in Section I, and the exclusive possession of atomic weapons by the two protagonists. The idea of freedom, moreover, is peculiarly and intolerably subversive of the idea of slavery. But the converse is not true. The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles. It is this fact which gives the present polarization of power the quality of crisis.

The free society values the individual as an end in himself, requiring of him only that measure of self-discipline and self-restraint which make the rights of each individual compatible with the rights of every other individual. The freedom of the individual has as its counterpart, therefore, the negative responsibility of the individual not to exercise his freedom in ways inconsistent with the freedom of other individuals and the positive responsibility to make constructive use of his freedom in the building of a just society.

From this idea of freedom with responsibility derives the marvelous diversity, the deep tolerance, the lawfulness of the free society. This is the explanation of the strength of free men. It constitutes the integrity and the vitality

of a free and democratic system. The free society attempts to create and maintain an environment in which every individual has the opportunity to realize his creative powers. It also explains why the free society tolerates those within it who would use their freedom to destroy it. By the same token, in relations between nations, the prime reliance of the free society is on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.

For the free society does not fear, it welcomes, diversity. It derives its strength from its hospitality even to antipathetic ideas. It is a market for free trade in ideas, secure in its faith that free men will take the best wares, and grow to a fuller and better realization of their powers in exercising their choice.

The idea of freedom is the most contagious idea in history, more contagious than the idea of submission to authority. For the breadth of freedom cannot be tolerated in a society which has come under the domination of an individual or group of individuals with a will to absolute power. Where the despot holds absolute power--the absolute power of the absolutely powerful will--all other wills must be subjugated in an act of willing submission, a degradation willed by the individual upon himself under the compulsion of a perverted faith. It is the first article of this faith that he finds and can only find the meaning of his existence in serving the ends of the system. The system becomes God, and submission to the will of God becomes submission to the will of the system. It is not enough to yield outwardly to the system--even Gandhian non-violence is not acceptable--for the spirit of resistance and the devotion to a higher authority might then remain, and the individual would not be wholly submissive.

The same compulsion which demands total power over all men within the Soviet state without a single exception, demands total power over all Communist Parties and all states under Soviet domination. Thus Stalin has said that the theory and tactics of Leninism as expounded by the Bolshevik party are mandatory for the proletarian parties of all countries. A true internationalist is defined as one who unhesitatingly upholds the position of the Soviet Union and in the satellite states true patriotism is love of the Soviet Union. By the same token the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union, described at a Party Congress as "a more advantageous form of fighting capitalism," is a device to divide and immobilize the non-Communist world, and the peace the Soviet Union seeks is the peace of total conformity to Soviet policy.

The antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy of the society whose end is absolute power. The existence and persistence of the idea of freedom is a permanent and continuous threat to the foundation of the slave society; and it therefore regards as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world. What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts the slave society with the free.

The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere. The shock we sustained in the destruction of Czechoslovakia was not in the measure of Czechoslovakia's material importance to us. In a material sense, her capabilities were already at Soviet disposal. But when the integrity of Czechoslovak institutions was destroyed, it was in the intangible scale of values that we registered a loss more damaging than the material loss we had already suffered.

Thus unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power.

B. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish. Logically and in fact, therefore, the Kremlin's challenge to the United States is directed not only to our values but to our physical capacity to protect their environment. It is a challenge which encompasses both peace and war and our objectives in peace and war must take account of it.

1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength.
2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world. It is only by practical affirmation, abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design.
3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society.

In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check the Kremlin design, for the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy. We should limit our requirement of the Soviet Union to its participation with other nations on the basis of equality and respect for the rights of others. Subject to this requirement, we must with our allies and the former subject peoples seek to create a world society based on the principle of consent. Its framework cannot be inflexible. It will consist of many national communities of great and varying abilities and resources, and hence of war potential. The seeds of conflicts will inevitably exist or will come into being. To acknowledge this is only to acknowledge the impossibility of a final solution. Not to acknowledge it can be fatally dangerous in a world in which there are no final solutions.

All these objectives of a free society are equally valid and necessary in peace and war. But every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we seek to achieve them by the strategy of the cold war. It is only by developing the moral and material strength of the free world that the Soviet regime will become convinced of the falsity of its assumptions and that the pre-conditions for workable agreements can be created. By practically demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a frustration of the Soviet design. Short of this, however, it might be possible to create a situation which will induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world. Such a development would be a triumph for the idea of freedom and democracy. It must be an immediate objective of United States policy.

There is no reason, in the event of war, for us to alter our overall objectives. They do not include unconditional surrender, the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential. Such a course would irrevocably unite the Russian people behind the regime which enslaves them. Rather these objectives contemplate Soviet acceptance of the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will have a new chance to work out their own destiny. If we can make the Russian people our allies in the enterprise we will obviously have made our task easier and victory more certain.

The objectives outlined in NSC 20/4 (November 23, 1948) ... are fully consistent with the objectives stated in this paper, and they remain valid. The growing intensity of the conflict which has been imposed upon us, however, requires the changes of emphasis and the additions that are apparent. Coupled with the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union, the intensifying

struggle requires us to face the fact that we can expect no lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system.

C. MEANS

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.

Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its fundamental design. Thus it can make the best of several possible worlds, conducting the struggle on those levels where it considers it profitable and enjoying the benefits of a pseudo-peace on those levels where it is not ready for a contest. At the ideological or psychological level, in the struggle for men's minds, the conflict is worldwide. At the political and economic level, within states and in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of the peace, although using its vast forces to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation, and the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our purpose.

We have no such freedom of choice, and least of all in the use of force. Resort to war is not only a last resort for a free society, but it is also an act which cannot definitively end the fundamental conflict in the realm of ideas. The idea of slavery can only be overcome by the timely and persistent demonstration of the superiority of the idea of freedom. Military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict, for although the ability of the Kremlin to threaten our security might be for a time destroyed, the resurgence of totalitarian forces and the re-establishment of the Soviet system or its equivalent would not be long delayed unless great progress were made in the fundamental conflict.

Practical and ideological considerations therefore both impel us to the conclusion that we have no choice but to demonstrate the superiority of the idea of freedom by its constructive application, and to attempt to change the world situation by means short of war in such a way as to frustrate the Kremlin design and hasten the decay of the Soviet system.

For us the role of military power is to serve the national purpose by deterring an attack upon us while we seek by other means to create an environment in which our free society can flourish, and by fighting, if necessary, to defend the integrity and vitality of our free society and to defeat any aggressor. The Kremlin uses Soviet military power to back up and serve the Kremlin design. It does not hesitate to use military force aggressively if that course is expedient in the achievement of its design. The differences between our fundamental purpose and the Kremlin design, therefore, are reflected in our respective attitudes toward and use of military force.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the *Federalist* (No. 28) "The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief." The mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war of annihilation, and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our interest not to let it become a global war. Our aim in applying force must be to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our objectives, and our capabilities for the application of force should, therefore, within the limits of what we can sustain over the long pull, be congruent to the range of tasks which we may encounter.

V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities

A. POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL

The Kremlin's design for world domination begins at home. The first concern of a despotic oligarchy is that the local base of its power and authority be secure. The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political purges within the USSR and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD [the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs] are evidence that the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and that "the entire coercive force of the socialist state" is more than ever one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over "the economy, manner of life, and consciousness of people" (Vyshinski, *The Law of the Soviet State*, p. 74). Similar evidence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe leads to the conclusion that this same policy, in less advanced phases, is being applied to the Kremlin's colonial areas.

Being a totalitarian dictatorship, the Kremlin's objectives in these policies is the total subjective submission of the peoples now under its control. The concentration camp is the prototype of the society which these policies are designed to achieve, a society in which the personality of the individual is so broken and perverted that he participates affirmatively in his own degradation.

The Kremlin's policy toward areas not under its control is the elimination of resistance to its will and the extension of its influence and control. It is driven to follow this policy because it cannot, for the reasons set forth in Chapter IV, tolerate the existence of free societies; to the Kremlin the most mild and inoffensive free society is an affront, a challenge and a subversive influence. Given the nature of the Kremlin, and the evidence at hand, it seems clear that the ends toward which this policy is directed are the same as those where its control has already been established.

The means employed by the Kremlin in pursuit of this policy are limited only by considerations of expediency. Doctrine is not a limiting factor; rather it dictates the employment of violence, subversion, and deceit, and rejects moral considerations. In any event, the Kremlin's conviction of its own infallibility has made its devotion to theory so subjective that past or present pronouncements as to doctrine offer no reliable guide to future actions. The only apparent restraints on resort to war are, therefore, calculations of practicality.

With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin's strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in the free and Soviet worlds which could destroy it. The Kremlin's policy toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex of forces, in this country and in the rest of the free world, on which our power is based. In this it has both adhered to doctrine and followed the sound principle of seeking maximum results with minimum risks and commitments. The present application of this strategy is a new form of expression for traditional Russian caution. However, there is no justification in Soviet theory or practice for predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that it could cause our downfall by one conclusive blow, it would not seek that solution.

In considering the capabilities of the Soviet world, it is of prime importance to remember that, in contrast to ours, they are being drawn upon close to the maximum possible extent. Also in contrast to us, the Soviet world can do more with less--it has a lower standard of living, its economy requires less to keep it functioning, and its military machine operates effectively with less elaborate equipment and organization.

The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement, because it 'is the inheritor of Russian imperialism, and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict, and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin's militancy. This dynamism serves to intensify all Soviet capabilities.

Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret police, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an instrument of propaganda, subversion and espionage. In its police apparatus, it has a domestic repressive instrument guaranteeing under present circumstances the continued security of the Kremlin. The demonstrated capabilities of these two basic organizations, operating openly or in disguise, in mass or through single agents, is unparalleled in history. The party, the police and the conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to create an overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among many peoples of the free world.

The ideological pretensions of the Kremlin are another great source of strength. Its identification of the Soviet system with communism, its peace campaigns and its championing of colonial peoples may be viewed with apathy, if not cynicism, by the oppressed totalitariats of the Soviet world, but in the free world these ideas find favorable responses in vulnerable segments of society. They have found a particularly receptive audience in Asia, especially as the Asiatics have been impressed by what has been plausibly portrayed to them as the rapid advance of the USSR from a backward society to a position of great world power. Thus, in its pretensions to being (a) the source of a new universal faith and (b) the model "scientific" society, the Kremlin cynically identifies itself with the genuine aspirations of large numbers of people, and places itself at the head of an international crusade with all of the benefits which derive therefrom.

Finally, there is a category of capabilities, strictly speaking neither institutional nor ideological, which should be taken into consideration. The extraordinary flexibility of Soviet tactics is certainly a strength. It derives from the utterly amoral and opportunistic conduct of Soviet policy. Combining this quality with the elements of secrecy, the Kremlin possesses a formidable capacity to act with the widest tactical latitude, with stealth, and with speed.

The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people.

That relationship is characterized by universal suspicion, fear, and denunciation. It is a relationship in which the Kremlin relies, not only for its power but its very survival, on intricately devised mechanisms of coercion. The Soviet monolith is held together by the iron curtain around it and the iron bars within it, not by any force of

natural cohesion. These artificial mechanisms of unity have never been intelligently challenged by a strong outside force. The full measure of their vulnerability is therefore not yet evident.

The Kremlin's relations with its satellites and their peoples is likewise a vulnerability. Nationalism still remains the most potent emotional-political force. The well-known ills of colonialism are compounded, however, by the excessive demands of the Kremlin that its satellites accept not only the imperial authority of Moscow but that they believe in and proclaim the ideological primacy and infallibility of the Kremlin. These excessive requirements can be made good only through extreme coercion. The result is that if a satellite feels able to effect its independence of the Kremlin, as Tito was able to do, it is likely to break away.

In short, Soviet ideas and practices run counter to the best and potentially the strongest instincts of men, and deny their most fundamental aspirations. Against an adversary which effectively affirmed the constructive and hopeful instincts of men and was capable of fulfilling their fundamental aspirations, the Soviet system might prove to be fatally weak.

The problem of succession to Stalin is also a Kremlin vulnerability. In a system where supreme power is acquired and held through violence and intimidation, the transfer of that power may well produce a period of instability.

In a very real sense, the Kremlin is a victim of, its own dynamism. This dynamism can become a weakness if it is frustrated, if in its forward thrusts it encounters a superior force which halts the expansion and exerts a superior counterpressure. Yet the Kremlin cannot relax the condition of crisis and mobilization, for to do so would be to lose its dynamism, whereas the seeds of decay within the Soviet system would begin to flourish and fructify.

The Kremlin is, of course, aware of these weaknesses. It must know that in the present world situation they are of secondary significance. So long as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchallenged by clearly superior counter-force--spiritual as well as material--its vulnerabilities are largely inoperative and even concealed by its successes. The Kremlin has not yet been given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot within its system.

B. ECONOMIC

The Kremlin has no economic intentions unrelated to its overall policies. Economics in the Soviet world is not an end in itself. The Kremlin's policy, in so far as it has to do with economics, is to utilize economic processes to contribute to the overall strength, particularly the war-making capacity of the Soviet system. The material welfare of the totalitariat is severely subordinated to the interest of the system.

As for capabilities, even granting optimistic Soviet reports of production, the total economic strength of the U.S.S.R. compares with that of the U.S. as roughly one to four. This is reflected not only in gross national product (1949: USSR \$65 billion; U.S. \$250 billion), but in production of key commodities in 1949:

	U.S.	USSR	USSR and EUROPEAN ORBIT COMBINED
Ingot Steel (million met. tons)	80.4	21.5	28.0

Primary aluminum (thousand met. tons)	617.6	130-135	140-145
Electric power (billion kwh)	410	72	112
Crude oil (million met. tons)	276.5	33.0	38.9

Assuming the maintenance of present policies, while a large U.S. advantage is likely to remain, the Soviet Union will be steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the U.S. by continuing to devote proportionately more to capital investment than the U.S.

But a full-scale effort by the U.S. would be capable of precipitately altering this trend. The USSR today is on a near maximum production basis. No matter what efforts Moscow might make, only a relatively slight change in the rate of increase in overall production could be brought about. In the U.S., on the other hand, a very rapid absolute expansion could be realized. The fact remains, however, that so long as the Soviet Union is virtually mobilized, and the United States has scarcely begun to summon up its forces, the greater capabilities of the U.S. are to that extent inoperative in the struggle for power. Moreover, as the Soviet attainment of an atomic capability has demonstrated, the totalitarian state, at least in time of peace, can focus its efforts on any given project far more readily than the democratic state.

In other fields--general technological competence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.--the gap between the USSR and the U.S. roughly corresponds to the gap in production. In the field of scientific research, however, the margin of United States superiority is unclear, especially if the Kremlin can utilize European talents.

C. MILITARY

The Soviet Union is developing the military capacity to support its design for world domination. The Soviet Union actually possesses armed forces far in excess of those necessary to defend its national territory. These armed forces are probably not yet considered by the Soviet Union to be sufficient to initiate a war which would involve the United States. This excessive strength, coupled now with an atomic capability, provides the Soviet Union with great coercive power for use in time of peace in furtherance of its objectives and serves as a deterrent to the victims of its aggression from taking any action in opposition to its tactics which would risk war.

Should a major war occur in 1950 the Soviet Union and its satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out the following campaigns.

- a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East; and to consolidate Communist gains in the Far East;
- b. To launch air attacks against the British Isles and air and sea attacks against the lines of communications of the Western Powers in the Atlantic and the Pacific;
- c. To attack selected targets with atomic weapons, now including the likelihood of such attacks against targets in Alaska, Canada, and the United States. Alternatively, this capability, coupled with other actions open to the Soviet Union, might deny the United Kingdom as an effective base of operations for allied forces. It also should be possible for the Soviet Union to prevent any allied "Normandy" type amphibious operations intended to force a reentry into the continent of Europe.

After the Soviet Union completed its initial campaigns and consolidated its positions in the Western European area, it could simultaneously conduct:

- a. Full-scale air and limited sea operations against the British Isles;
- b. Invasions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas;
- c. Further operations in the Near and Middle East, continued air operations against the North American continent, and air and sea operations against Atlantic and Pacific lines of communication; and
- d. Diversionary attacks in other areas.

During the course of the offensive operations listed in the second and third paragraphs above, the Soviet Union will have an air defense capability with respect to the vital areas of its own and its satellites' territories which can oppose but cannot prevent allied air operations against these areas.

It is not known whether the Soviet Union possesses war reserves and arsenal capabilities sufficient to supply its satellite armies or even its own forces throughout a long war. It might not be in the interest of the Soviet Union to equip fully its satellite armies, since the possibility of defections would exist.

It is not possible at this time to assess accurately the finite disadvantages to the Soviet Union which may accrue through the implementation of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. It should be expected that, as this implementation progresses, the internal security situation of the recipient nations should improve concurrently. In addition, a strong United States military position, plus increases in the armaments of the nations of Western Europe, should strengthen the determination of the recipient nations to counter Soviet moves and in event of war could be considered as likely to delay operations and increase the time required for the Soviet Union to overrun Western Europe. In all probability, although United States backing will stiffen their determination, the armaments increase under the present aid programs will not be of any major consequence prior to 1952. Unless the military strength of the Western European nations is increased on a much larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated rate, it is more than likely that those nations will not be able to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Considering the Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or, in any event, to delay materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on the continent against Soviet Union offensives.

We do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability is but the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence estimates, concurred in by State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission, assign to the Soviet Union a production capability giving it a fission bomb stockpile within the following ranges:

By mid-1950	10-20
By mid-1951	25-45
By mid-1952	45-90
By mid-1953	70-135
By mid-1954	200

This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet activities and represents the production capabilities of known or deducible Soviet plants. If others exist, as is possible, this estimate could lead us into a feeling of superiority in our atomic stockpile that might be dangerously misleading, particularly with regard to the timing of a possible Soviet offensive. On the other hand, if the Soviet Union experiences operating difficulties, this estimate would be reduced. There is some evidence that the Soviet Union is acquiring certain materials essential to research on and development of thermonuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union now has aircraft able to deliver the atomic bomb. Our Intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union an atomic bomber capability already in excess of that needed to deliver available bombs. We have at present no evaluated estimate regarding the Soviet accuracy of delivery on target. It is believed that the Soviets cannot deliver their bombs on target with a degree of accuracy comparable to ours, but a planning estimate might well place it at 40-60 percent of bombs sorted. For planning purposes, therefore, the date the Soviets possess an atomic stockpile of 200 bombs would be a critical date for the United States, for the delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States would seriously damage this country.

At the time the Soviet Union has a substantial atomic stockpile and if it is assumed that it will strike a strong surprise blow and if it is assumed further that its atomic attacks will be met with no more effective defense opposition than the United States and its allies have programmed, results of those attacks could include:

- a. Laying waste to the British Isles and thus depriving the Western Powers of their use as a base;
- b. Destruction of the vital centers and of the communications of Western Europe, thus precluding effective defense by the Western Powers; and
- c. Delivering devastating attacks on certain vital centers of the United States and Canada.

The possession by the Soviet Union of a thermonuclear capability in addition to this substantial atomic stockpile would result in tremendously increased damage.

During this decade, the defensive capabilities of the Soviet Union will probably be strengthened, particularly by the development and use of modern aircraft, aircraft warning and communications devices, and defensive guided missiles.

Source: Naval War College Review, Vol. XXVII (May-June, 1975), pp. 51-108. Also in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Volume I.

Text Dependent Questions:

Day One:

1. What were the “fundamental decisions” to be considered before a decision could be made to proceed with the outlined program?
2. What considerations did the document refer to that must be weighed before making those “fundamental decisions”?
3. What factors had altered the “historic distribution of power” in the world?
4. How does the “fundamental purpose” of the United States conflict with the “fundamental design” of the Soviet Union?
5. According to the document, what is the “strength of free men”?
6. What is meant by “even Gandhian non-violence is not acceptable” and why wasn’t it acceptable to combat despot rule?
7. How does the document compare the Soviet state to a slave state?
8. According to the text, what are the “objectives of a free society”?
9. Why wasn’t “the subjugation of the Russian peoples or a Russia shorn of its economic potential” an objective according to the document?
10. What warranted “the resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will” of a free society?

Day Two:

11. What is the author’s meaning when stating that the Kremlin is “more than ever seeking to impose its absolute authority over “the economy, manner of life, and conscious of people”?”
12. According to the document, what motivates the Soviet Union’s “virulent blend of hatred and fear” of the United States?
13. What does the author mean by “persistent crisis, conflict, and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin’s militancy”?
14. What are the three areas that provide the Kremlin its strength and why?
15. What are the three areas that are the Kremlin’s greatest vulnerabilities and why?
16. What military actions, according to the document, was the Soviet Union “to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out”?
17. What is the suggested “long range allied military objective in Western Europe” and why was it considered an imperative?
18. How is the Soviet Union portrayed in NSC-68?
19. In 1947, before issuing what came to be called the Truman Doctrine, Harry Truman was advised to “scare the hell” out of the American people about the threat of Soviet expansionism. How does NSC-68 reflect this effort?
20. Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that “The purpose of NSC-68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out’.” How was this exhibited in the document?

Resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,

Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel,

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea¹ that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security,

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Adopted at the 474th meeting by 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia).²

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16, 474th meeting, p. 2 (document S/1507).

² Two members (Egypt, India) did not participate in the voting; one member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.

Source: UN Security Council, Resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950, 27 June 1950, S/RES/83 (1950), available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f20a2c.html> [accessed 17 July 2012]

Text Dependent Questions:

1. Ever since the late 19th century Korea had been under Japanese rule, but was liberated by U.S. and Soviet troops in 1945. What was the significance of the “38th parallel” in Korea?
2. North Korea, known as the Democratic Peoples Republic, was backed by China and the Soviet Union. To what extent did NSC-68 play a role in the United States backing South Korea, known as the Republic of Korea?
3. In the early days of the Korean War, President Harry S. Truman referred to the United States response to the North Korean invasion as a "police action" under the aegis of the United Nations who called for “urgent military measures...required to restore international peace and security”. Why did the United States wait for a resolution of the United Nation and not just declare war against North Korea?
4. This type of resolution would require a unanimous vote by the 5 permanent members of the United Nations, of which the Soviet Union was one. How was this resolution passed?
5. Why was Resolution 83 seen as a diplomatic victory for the United States?

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 Week 4

Formative Assessment

Text dependent questions that follow the primary source document.

Focus Question

How was the Cuban Missile Crisis averted?

Learning Objectives

- Use historical thinking skills such as sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating to answer historical questions.
- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.
- Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content by introducing precise, knowledgeable claim(s), establishing the significance of the claim(s), distinguishing the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and creating an organization that logically sequences the claim(s), counterclaims, reasons, and evidence.

Possible Activities and Support

Download John F. Kennedy's Television Address Regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) from <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/67jJ6PtRTEmn5JJmhgiFYA.aspx>
 Show video clips from docudrama “Thirteen Days”
 Political Cartoon Analysis-Locate political cartoons from the era and ask students to analyze the symbolism of the cartoon as it pertains to the documents being reviewed.
 Document Analysis Forms from the National Archives to assist students in reading and analyzing the documents.

Content-Specific Vocabulary/Terms

Suggested Text(s)

Bay of Pigs Cuban Missile Crisis Nuclear Proliferation	Robert Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962) Dobrynin Cable to USSR (1962)
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Standards Alignment:

CCSS RH.10-11.1, RH.10-11.2, RH.10-11.3, RH.10-11.4, RH.10-11.5, RH.10-11.6, RH.10-11.7, RH.10-11.8, RH.10-11.9, RH.10-11.10, WHST.10-11.1, WHST.10-11.2, WHST.10-11.4, WHST.10-11.9
 NJCCCS 6.1.12.A.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.c

The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War

Week 4 Overview

Learning Objective: The goal of this week long plan is to give students the opportunity to explore the issues that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Many historians believe the Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the United States and Soviet Union ever got to all-out nuclear war. For 13 days in October, 1962, the two superpowers stood on the brink of thermonuclear war as the Kennedy administration sought to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba by blockading the island's ports as well as through diplomatic means. Eventually the Russians removed the missiles largely through a behind the scenes negotiation. By reading and rereading the passages closely, combined with classroom discussion about it, students will explore the negotiation which led to an ending of the crisis. Students will need to consider the emotional context of words and how diction (word choice) affects an author's message. When combined with writing about the passage and teacher feedback, students will form a deeper understanding of how politics played a role in U.S. foreign policy.

Reading Task: Students will silently read the passage in question on a given day—first independently and then following along with the text as the teacher and/or skillful students read aloud. Depending on the difficulties of a given text and the teacher's knowledge of the fluency abilities of students, the order of the student silent read and the teacher reading aloud with students following might be reversed. What is important is to allow all students to interact with challenging text on their own as frequently and independently as possible. Students will then reread specific passages in response to a set of concise, text-dependent questions that compel them to examine the meaning and structure of the presidential address. Therefore, rereading is deliberately built into the instructional unit.

Vocabulary Task: Most of the meanings of words in the exemplar text can be discovered by students from careful reading of the context in which they appear. Teachers can use discussions to model and reinforce how to learn vocabulary from contextual clues, and students must be held accountable for engaging in this practice.

Sentence Syntax Task: On occasion students will encounter particularly difficult sentences to decode. Teachers should engage in a close examination of such sentences to help students discover how they are built and how they convey meaning. While many questions addressing important aspects of the text double as questions about syntax, students should receive regular supported practice in deciphering complex sentences. It is crucial that the help they receive in unpacking text complexity focuses both on the precise meaning of what the author is saying and why the author might have constructed the sentence in this particular fashion. That practice will in turn support students' ability to unpack meaning from syntactically complex sentences they encounter in future reading.

Discussion Task: Students will discuss the exemplar text in depth with their teacher and their classmates, performing activities that result in a close reading of the Dobrynin Cable to USSR (1962) and Robert Kennedy's Memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962). The goal is to foster student confidence when encountering complex text and to reinforce the skills they have acquired regarding how to build and extend their understanding of a text. A general principle is to always reread the passage that provides evidence for the question under discussion. This gives students another encounter with the text, helping them develop fluency and reinforcing their use of text evidence.

Writing Task: Students will write an explanatory paragraph using their understanding of the word choice and emotions expressed in the selection to present their opinions about what these men were trying to convey. Teachers might afford students the opportunity to revise their paragraphs after participating in classroom discussion or receiving teacher feedback, allowing them to refashion both their understanding of the text and their expression of that understanding.

Outline of Lesson Plan: This lesson can be delivered in a week of instruction and reflection on the part of students and their teacher.

Summary of Close Reading Activities

Day One:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (Robert Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962)) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Two:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (Dobrynin Cable to USSR (1962)) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Three and Four:

Socratic seminars are named for their embodiment of Socrates' belief in the power of asking questions, prize inquiry over information and discussion over debate. Socratic seminars acknowledge the highly social nature of learning and align with the work of John Dewey, Lev Vygotsky, Jean Piaget, and Paulo Friere.

Elfie Israel succinctly defines Socratic seminars and implies their rich benefits for students:

The Socratic seminar is a formal discussion, based on the text, in which the leader asks open-ended questions. Within the context of the discussion, students listen closely to the comments of others, thinking critically for themselves, and articulate their own thoughts and their responses to the thoughts of others. They learn to work cooperatively and to question intelligently and civilly. (89)

Israel, Elfie. "Examining Multiple Perspectives in Literature." In Inquiry and the Literary Text: Constructing Discussions in the English Classroom. James Holden and John S. Schmit, eds. Urbana, IL: NCTE, 2002.

In a Socratic Seminar, the participants carry the burden of responsibility for the quality of the discussion. Good discussions occur when participants study the text closely in advance, listen actively, share their ideas and questions in response to the ideas and questions of others, and search for evidence in the text to support their ideas. The discussion is not about right answers; it is not a debate. Students are encouraged to think out loud and to exchange ideas openly while examining ideas in a rigorous, thoughtful, manner.

Day Five:

Teacher then assigns a culminating writing assignment that asks students to synthesize the entire reading such as: Why did the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba trigger an international crisis and citing evidence from the texts, how was that crisis averted?

Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Dean Rusk on Meeting with Anatoly F. Dobrynin on 27 October 1962

TOP SECRET

Office of the Attorney General Washington, D.C. October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

At the request of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told him first that we understood that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2's had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were flying unarmed planes. I told him that this was an extremely serious turn in events. We would have to make certain decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This could not help but bring on further incidents and that he had better understand the full implications of this matter.

He raised the point that the argument the Cubans were making was that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not been violating Cuban air space then we would still be believing what he and Khrushchev had said--that there were no long-range missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that this matter was far more serious than the air space over Cuba and involved peoples all over the world. I said that he had better understand the situation and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately and publicly, that this would never be done. I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed.

This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take retaliatory actions but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians.

He then asked me what offer we were making. I said a letter had just been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy which stated in substance that the missile bases should be dismantled and all offensive weapons should be removed from Cuba. In return, if Cuba and Castro and the Communists ended their subversive activities in other Central and Latin-American countries, we would agree to keep peace in the Caribbean and not permit an invasion from American soil. He then asked me about Khrushchev's other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo -- no deal of this kind could be made.

This was a matter that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union. If some time elapsed -- and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months -- I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactorily. [crossed out by hand--ed.]

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately. I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

RFK: amn.

Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; provided to CWIHP by Prof. Peter Roman, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.

Text Dependent Questions:

1. How were the long range missiles in Cuba discovered?
2. What was Dobrynin's response to how the missiles were discovered?
3. What did Robert Kennedy state would be the consequences of not removing the missiles?
4. According to the memo, what deal was discussed and rejected regarding Turkey?
5. Why did Robert Kennedy state that any deal involving Turkey was a matter for NATO to decide?
6. What possible insinuation was made in the memo regarding Turkey?
7. What possible reason did John F. Kennedy have for having this meeting taking place between Dobrynin with his brother Robert Kennedy rather than Dean Rusk?

Cable from USSR ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry

TOP SECRET
Making Copies Prohibited
Copy No. 1

CIPHERED TELEGRAM

Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come see him. We talked alone. The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, continues to quickly worsen. We have just received a report that an unarmed American plane was shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The military is demanding that the President arm such planes and respond to fire with fire. The USA government will have to do this.

I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him what right American planes had to fly over Cuba at all, crudely violating its sovereignty and accepted international norms? How would the USA have reacted if foreign planes appeared over its territory?

"We have a resolution of the Organization of American states that gives us the right to such overflights," R. Kennedy quickly replied.

I told him that the Soviet Union, like all peace-loving countries, resolutely rejects such a "right" or, to be more exact, this kind of true lawlessness, when people who don't like the social-political situation in a country try to impose their will on it-a small state where the people themselves established and maintained [their system]. "The OAS resolution is a direct violation of the UN Charter," I added, "and you, as the Attorney General of the USA, the highest American legal entity, should certainly know that."

R. Kennedy said that he realized that we had different approaches to these problems and it was not likely that we could convince each other. But now the matter is not in these differences, since time is of the essence. "I want," R. Kennedy stressed, "to lay out the current alarming situation the way the president sees it. He wants N.S. Khrushchev to know this. This is the thrust of the situation now."

"Because of the plane that was shot down, there is now strong pressure on the president to give an order to respond with fire if fired upon when American reconnaissance planes are flying over Cuba. The USA can't stop these flights, because this is the only way we can quickly get information about the state of construction of the missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a very serious threat to our national security. But if we start to fire in response-a chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop. The same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of the missile bases in Cuba. The USA government is determined to get rid of those bases-up to, in the extreme case, bombing them, since, I repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of the USA. But in response to the bombing of these bases, in the course of which Soviet specialists might suffer, the Soviet government will undoubtedly respond with the same against us, somewhere in Europe. A real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will die. We want to avoid that any way we can, Gm sure that the government of the USSR has the same wish. However, taking time to find a way out [of the situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy mentioned as if in passing that there are many unreasonable heads among the generals, and not only among the generals, who are 'itching for a fight'). The situation might get out of control, with irreversible consequences.

"In this regard," R Kennedy said, "the president considers that a suitable basis for regulating the entire Cuban conflict might be the letter N.S. Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in response from the President, which was sent off today to N.S. Khrushchev through the US Embassy in Moscow. The most important thing for us," R. Kennedy stressed, "is to get as soon as possible the agreement of the Soviet government to halt further work on the construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under international control that would make it impossible to use these weapons. In exchange the government of the USA is ready, in addition to repealing all measures on the "quarantine," to give the assurances that there will not be any invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same assurances-the US government is certain of this."

"And what about Turkey?" I asked R Kennedy.

"If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president doesn't see any insurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue," replied R. Kennedy. "The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done by a special decision of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral decision by the president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey-this would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows very well, there are many arguments. In short, if such a decision were announced now it would seriously tear apart NATO.

"However, President Kennedy is ready to come to agreement on that question with N.S. Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey," R. Kennedy said, "we need 4 -5 months. This is the minimum amount of time necessary for the US government to do this, taking into account the procedures that exist within the NATO framework. On the whole Turkey issue," R Kennedy added, "if Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I've said, we can continue to exchange opinions between him and the president, using him, R. Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. However, the president can't say anything public in this regard about Turkey," R Kennedy said again.

R. Kennedy then warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington.

"That's all that he asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev," R Kennedy said in conclusion. "The president also asked N.S. Khrushchev to give him an answer (through the Soviet ambassador and R. Kennedy) if possible within the next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to have a business-like, clear answer in principle. [He asked him] not to get into a wordy discussion, which might drag things out. The current serious situation, unfortunately, is such that there is very little time to resolve this whole issue. Unfortunately, events are developing too quickly. The request for a reply tomorrow," stressed R. Kennedy, "is just that a request, and not an ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of the Soviet government will understand him correctly."

I noted that it went without saying that the Soviet government would not accept any ultimatums and it was good that the American government realized that. I also reminded him of N.S. Khrushchev's appeal in his last letter to the president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolving this question. Then I told R. Kennedy that the president's thoughts would be brought to the attention of the head of the Soviet government. I also said that I would contact him as soon as there was a reply. In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me the number of a direct telephone line to the White House.

In the course of the conversation, R. Kennedy noted that he knew about the conversation that television commentator Scan had yesterday with an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate the Cuban conflict [one- and-a-half lines whited out].

I should say that during our meeting R. Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I've never seen him like this before. True, about twice he tried to return to the topic of "deception," (that he talked about so persistently during our previous meeting), but he did so in passing and without any edge to it. He didn't even try to get into fights on various subjects, as he usually does, and only persistently returned to one topic: time is of the essence and we shouldn't miss the chance.

After meeting with me he immediately went to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy said, he spends almost all his time now.

27/X-62 A. DOBRYNfN

Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, translation from copy provided by NHK, in Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), appendix, pp. 523-526; also printed in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin No. 5, with minor revisions.

Text Dependent Questions:

1. What is Dobrynin's first reaction to hearing that an unarmed American plane flying over Cuba had been shot down?
2. Why did Robert Kennedy say that reconnaissance flights over Cuba could not be stopped?
3. What did Kennedy say would be the "chain reaction" in the United States "fired if fired upon"?
4. What was the U.S. government prepared to concede if Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba?
5. According to Dobrynin, what was Robert Kennedy's response to the question of Turkey?
6. Why, according to Dobrynin, did Robert Kennedy say the President was "unable to publicly discuss the issue of Turkey"?
7. What was the time frame given in which a decision needed to be made by the Soviet government in regards to missiles in Cuba? Why was "time of the essence"?

Newark Public Schools
 United States History II
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 Week 5

Formative Assessment

Text dependent questions that follow the primary source document.

Focus Question

Was the U.S. planning to go to war with North Vietnam before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution?

Learning Objectives

- Use historical thinking skills such as sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating to answer historical questions.
- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.
- Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content by introducing precise, knowledgeable claim(s), establishing the significance of the claim(s), distinguishing the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and creating an organization that logically sequences the claim(s), counterclaims, reasons, and evidence.

Possible Activities and Support

Political Cartoon Analysis-Locate political cartoons from the era and ask students to analyze the symbolism of the cartoon as it pertains to the documents being reviewed.
 Document Analysis Forms from the National Archives to assist students in reading and analyzing the documents.

Content-Specific Vocabulary/Terms

Suggested Text(s)

Red China

Draft Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President (1964)
 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964)

Standards Alignment:

CCSS RH.10-11.1, RH.10-11.2, RH.10-11.3, RH.10-11.4, RH.10-11.5, RH.10-11.6, RH.10-11.7, RH.10-11.8, RH.10-11.9, RH.10-11.10, WHST.10-11.1, WHST.10-11.2, WHST.10-11.4, WHST.10-11.9
 NJCCCS 6.1.12.A.12.a, 6.1.12.A.12.b, 6.1.12.D.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.e

The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War

Week 5 Overview

Learning Objective: The goal of this week long plan is to give students the opportunity to explore the issue(s) surrounding U.S. entry into the Vietnam War. Most history books say that the United States war in Vietnam began in 1964, after Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. However, it's no secret that the United States had been very involved in the region for at least a decade before. By the time JFK was assassinated in 1963, the United States had 16,000 military troops in Vietnam. By reading and rereading the passages closely, combined with classroom discussion about it, students will explore whether the U.S. planning to go to war in Vietnam before August 1964 and the supposed Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred. Students will need to consider the emotional context of words and how diction (word choice) affects an author's message. When combined with writing about the passage and teacher feedback, students will form a deeper understanding of how politics played a role in U.S. foreign policy.

Reading Task: Students will silently read the passage in question on a given day—first independently and then following along with the text as the teacher and/or skillful students read aloud. Depending on the difficulties of a given text and the teacher's knowledge of the fluency abilities of students, the order of the student silent read and the teacher reading aloud with students following might be reversed. What is important is to allow all students to interact with challenging text on their own as frequently and independently as possible. Students will then reread specific passages in response to a set of concise, text-dependent questions that compel them to examine the meaning and structure of the presidential address. Therefore, rereading is deliberately built into the instructional unit.

Vocabulary Task: Most of the meanings of words in the exemplar text can be discovered by students from careful reading of the context in which they appear. Teachers can use discussions to model and reinforce how to learn vocabulary from contextual clues, and students must be held accountable for engaging in this practice.

Sentence Syntax Task: On occasion students will encounter particularly difficult sentences to decode. Teachers should engage in a close examination of such sentences to help students discover how they are built and how they convey meaning. While many questions addressing important aspects of the text double as questions about syntax, students should receive regular supported practice in deciphering complex sentences. It is crucial that the help they receive in unpacking text complexity focuses both on the precise meaning of what the author is saying and why the author might have constructed the sentence in this particular fashion. That practice will in turn support students' ability to unpack meaning from syntactically complex sentences they encounter in future reading.

Discussion Task: Students will discuss the exemplar text in depth with their teacher and their classmates, performing activities that result in a close reading of the Draft Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President (1964) and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964). The goal is to foster student confidence when encountering complex text and to reinforce the skills they have acquired regarding how to build and extend their understanding of a text. A general principle is to always reread the passage that provides evidence for the question under discussion. This gives students another encounter with the text, helping them develop fluency and reinforcing their use of text evidence.

Writing Task: Students will write an explanatory paragraph using their understanding of the word choice and emotions expressed in the selection to present their opinions about what was the motivation of the U.S. in regards to war in Vietnam. Teachers might afford students the opportunity to revise their paragraphs after participating in classroom discussion or receiving teacher feedback, allowing them to refashion both their understanding of the text and their expression of that understanding.

Outline of Lesson Plan: This lesson can be delivered in a week of instruction and reflection on the part of students and their teacher.

Summary of Close Reading Activities

Day One:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (Draft Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President (1964)) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 1-5 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Two:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (Draft Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President (1964)) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 6-17 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Three:

Teacher introduces the day's passage (Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964)) with minimal commentary and students read it independently.

Teacher or a skillful reader then reads paragraphs 26-29 of the passage out loud to the class as students follow along in the text.

Returning to the text, the teacher asks students a small set of guiding reading questions about the text.

Day Four:

Socratic seminars are named for their embodiment of Socrates' belief in the power of asking questions, prize inquiry over information and discussion over debate. Socratic seminars acknowledge the highly social nature of learning and align with the work of John Dewey, Lev Vygotsky, Jean Piaget, and Paulo Friere.

Elfie Israel succinctly defines Socratic seminars and implies their rich benefits for students:

The Socratic seminar is a formal discussion, based on the text, in which the leader asks open-ended questions. Within the context of the discussion, students listen closely to the comments of others, thinking critically for themselves, and articulate their own thoughts and their responses to the thoughts of others. They learn to work cooperatively and to question intelligently and civilly. (89)

Israel, Elfie. "Examining Multiple Perspectives in Literature." In Inquiry and the Literary Text: Constructing Discussions in the English Classroom. James Holden and John S. Schmit, eds. Urbana, IL: NCTE, 2002.

In a Socratic Seminar, the participants carry the burden of responsibility for the quality of the discussion. Good discussions occur when participants study the text closely in advance, listen actively, share their ideas and questions in response to the ideas and questions of others, and search for evidence in the text to support their ideas. The discussion is not about right answers; it is not a debate. Students are encouraged to think out loud and to exchange ideas openly while examining ideas in a rigorous, thoughtful, manner.

Day Five:

Teacher then assigns a culminating writing assignment that asks students to synthesize the entire reading such as: Citing evidence from the texts, evaluate whether the U.S. was planning to go to war with North Vietnam before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

Draft Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President

Washington, May 25, 1964.

- SUBJECT
- Basic Recommendation and Projected Course of Action on Southeast Asia

I. Basic Recommendation

1. It is recommended that you make a Presidential decision that the U.S. will use selected and carefully graduated military force against North Vietnam, under the following conditions: (1) after appropriate diplomatic and political warning and preparation, and (2) unless such warning and preparation-in combination with other efforts-should produce a sufficient improvement of non-Communist prospects in South Vietnam and in Laos to make military action against North Vietnam unnecessary.

2. This basic Presidential decision is recommended on these premises:

- (1) that the U.S. cannot tolerate the loss of Southeast Asia to Communism;
- (2) that without a decision to resort to military action if necessary the present prospect is not hopeful, in South Vietnam or in Laos;
- (3) that a decision to use force if necessary, backed by resolute and extensive deployment, and conveyed by every possible means to our adversaries, gives the best present chance of avoiding the actual use of such force.

3. It is further recommended that our clear purpose in this decision should be to use all our influence to bring about a major reduction or elimination of North Vietnamese interference in Laos and in South Vietnam, and not to unroll a scenario aimed at the use of force as an end in itself. We will have further recommendations on the ways of stating U.S. objectives.

4. It is further recommended that in the execution of this decision all separate elements of the problem (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) and all separate geographical elements of it (in Laos, in South Vietnam, in Cambodia, and in North Vietnam itself) should be treated as parts of a single problem: the protection of Southeast Asia from further Communist encroachment.

5. It is the hope and best estimate of most of your advisers that a decision of this kind can be executed without bringing a major military reply from Red China, and still less from the Soviet Union. It is also the prevailing estimate that selective and carefully prepared military action against North Vietnam will not trigger acts of terror and military operations by the Viet Cong which would engulf the Khanh regime. Nevertheless, it is recognized that in making this decision we must accept two risks: (1) the risk of escalation toward major land war or the use of nuclear weapons; (2) the risk of a reply in South Vietnam itself which would lose that country to neutralism and so eventually to Communism.

II. An outline of the proposed sequence of actions

It is our current estimate that the actions which follow should be taken in the order in which they are listed. Especially in the later stages it might well be important to modify the sequence in the light of the development of events. In each major stage, moreover, there would be a number of connected actions. Finally, it must be remembered that the enemy has choices, too, and that this sequence might therefore be truncated or drastically modified by the actions of others.

(1) A Presidential decision as outlined in I. above.

(2) The establishment of communication with Hanoi (through the Canadians) and with other adversaries of major importance [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

The purpose of these communications would be to make very clear both the seriousness of U.S. will and the limited character of U.S. objectives. We intend that Communism shall not take over Southeast Asia, but we do not intend or desire the destruction of the Hanoi regime. If terror and subversion end, major improvement in relations is possible. It is only if they do not end that trouble is coming.

(3) A Honolulu conference and discussions with Thailand.

This meeting, which might occur early next week, would be directed to the establishment of full understanding with Ambassador Lodge and MACV, and to possible intense consultations with Ambassador Unger and Ambassador Martin from Thailand. At the same time, or just after, we would communicate our basic determination and our opening strategy to the governments of Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. This Honolulu meeting would imply major decisions also to intensify our efforts in South Vietnam (along lines to be presented in a separate paper).

(4) Action at the UN.

This would probably take a double form:

- (a) in the broadest terms, we would present the problem of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, together with much hitherto secret evidence proving Hanoi's responsibility;
- (b) in parliamentary terms, we would probably ask [for] a resolution confined to the Pathet Lao aggression in Laos. It is the current estimate of our UN experts that on a wider resolution involving South Vietnam we might not have the necessary seven votes for affirmative action. The one thing we do not want is to take our basic political case to the UN and fail to muster a majority.

The basic object of this exercise would be a double one:

- (a) to give worldwide publicity to the basic problem through the voice of Stevenson, and
- (b) to make it perfectly plain if we move to further action that we had done our best at the UN.

(5) A formal announcement by us and our friends that the requirements of the UN resolution (whether or not it was vetoed) are not being met.

The purpose of this step is to clarify again that we have tried the UN and that it is not our fault that there has been an inadequate response.

(6) Consultation of SEATO allies.

We believe this should take place both by a meeting of the SEATO Council in Bangkok and by more intense consultations in the capitals of the more energetic members of SEATO, notably Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, The Philippines, and Thailand. We do not expect Pak or French support. The object would be to obtain basic agreement on the next steps toward action and commitment of forces at as high a level as possible.

(7) The first deployments toward Southeast Asia of U.S. and, hopefully, allied forces.

It is our recommendation that these deployments be on a very large scale, from the beginning, so as to maximize their deterrent impact and their menace. We repeat our view that a pound of threat is worth an ounce of action—as long as we are not bluffing.

(8) A Congressional Resolution.

We agree that no such resolution should be sought until Civil Rights is off the Senate calendar, and we believe that the preceding stages can be conducted in such a way as to leave a free choice on the timing of such a resolution. Some of us recommend that we aim at presenting and passing the resolution between the passage of Civil Rights and the convening of the Republican Convention. Others believe that delay may be to our advantage and that we could as well handle the matter later in the summer, in spite of domestic politics.

(9) A further and expanded deployment of military force toward the theater.

The object of this continuing deployment, after the passage of the resolution, is to give still more time for threat to do the work of action.

(10) Initial strike against the north.

This would be very carefully designed to have more deterrent than destructive impact, as far as possible. This action would be accompanied by the simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. dependents from South Vietnam and by active diplomatic offensives in the Security Council, or in a Geneva Conference, or both, aimed at restoring the peace throughout the area. This peacekeeping theme will have been at the center of the whole enterprise from the beginning.

Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Luncheon with the President, Vol. I, Part 1. Top Secret Sensitive.

Text Dependent Questions:

Day 1:

1. What is the recommendation Bundy makes to the President in this draft memorandum in regards to Vietnam?
2. What other areas in Asia were targeted by this recommendation and why?
3. What risks were deemed inherent in making the decision to use force in Vietnam?

Day 2:

4. What was the “limited character of U.S. objectives” that needed to be communicated to Hanoi?
5. What actions did Bundy state he wanted “to make...perfectly plain if we move to further action” in regards to the United Nations?
6. Why did Bundy suggest a consultation of the “SEATO allies”?
7. What did Bundy mean when he stated, “a pound of threat is worth an ounce of action, as long as we are not bluffing”?
8. Why was the timing of the congressional resolution on the matter one of Bundy’s recommendations?
9. What actions needed to take place in South Vietnam before an initial strike against the Viet Cong?

Transcript of Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964)

Eighty-eighth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the seventh day of August, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-four

Joint Resolution

To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attackers are part of deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protest their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work out their destinies in their own way: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Section 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Text Dependent Questions:

1. How were issues in Vietnam different than in Korea?
2. How did President Johnson justify U.S. military action in Vietnam independent of U.N. action?
3. Why was it important to state that the United States “has no territorial, military, or political ambitions in that area”?
4. Was the Tonkin Gulf Resolution a declaration of war against Vietnam? Why or why not?
5. Why was section 3 troubling to many Americans?
6. Examine the date of the Draft Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President and the date of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. What conclusions can you draw?

Newark Public Schools
 United States History II
 “The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War”
 Week 6

Summative Assessment

Students will take an assessment analyzing primary and secondary source documents of the Cold War Era and write an argument citing evidence from those source documents in which they select and defend a position on who was primarily responsible for the Cold War.

Focus Question

Who was primarily responsible for the Cold War, the United States or the Soviet Union?

Learning Objectives

- Use historical thinking skills such as sourcing, contextualizing, close reading, and corroborating to answer historical questions.
- Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, connecting insights gained from specific details to an understanding of the text as a whole.
- Evaluate various explanations for actions or events and determine which explanation best accords with textual evidence, acknowledging where the text leaves matters uncertain.
- Integrate information from diverse sources, both primary and secondary, into a coherent understanding of an idea or event, noting discrepancies among sources.
- Write arguments focused on discipline-specific content by introducing precise, knowledgeable claim(s), establishing the significance of the claim(s), distinguishing the claim(s) from alternate or opposing claims, and creating an organization that logically sequences the claim(s), counterclaims, reasons, and evidence.

Possible Activities and Support

Political Cartoon Analysis-Locate political cartoons from the era and ask students to analyze the symbolism of the cartoon as it pertains to the documents being reviewed.

Content-Specific Vocabulary/Terms

Suggested Text(s)

Containment

Henry Wallace’s Letter to Truman “Achieving an Atmosphere of Mutual Trust and Confidence” (1946)
 The Truman Doctrine (1947)
 NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (1950)
 UN Security Council Resolution 83 (1950)
 Robert Kennedy Memorandum for Secretary of State Dean Rusk (1962)
 Dobrynin Cable to USSR (1962)
 Draft Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President (1964)
 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964)

Standards Alignment:

CCSS RH.10-11.1, RH.10-11.2, RH.10-11.3, RH.10-11.4, RH.10-11.5, RH.10-11.6, RH.10-11.7, RH.10-11.8, RH.10-11.9, RH.10-11.10, WHST.10-11.1, WHST.10-11.2, WHST.10-11.4, WHST.10-11.9
 NJCCCS 6.1.12.A.12.a, 6.1.12.B.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.a, 6.1.12.D.12.c, 6.1.12.D.12.e

The Post-War United States (1945-1970) The Cold War

Week 6 Overview

Learning Objective: The goal of this week long plan is to give students the opportunity to synthesize the readings of the past five weeks.

Reading Task: Students will then reread specific passages in response to a set of concise, text-dependent questions that compel them to examine the meaning and structure of the documents for the purpose of addressing the summative assessment question.

Vocabulary Task: Most of the meanings of words in the exemplar text can be discovered by students from careful reading of the context in which they appear. Teachers can use discussions to model and reinforce how to learn vocabulary from contextual clues, and students must be held accountable for engaging in this practice.

Sentence Syntax Task: On occasion students will encounter particularly difficult sentences to decode. Teachers should engage in a close examination of such sentences to help students discover how they are built and how they convey meaning. While many questions addressing important aspects of the text double as questions about syntax, students should receive regular supported practice in deciphering complex sentences. It is crucial that the help they receive in unpacking text complexity focuses both on the precise meaning of what the author is saying and why the author might have constructed the sentence in this particular fashion. That practice will in turn support students' ability to unpack meaning from syntactically complex sentences they encounter in future reading.

Discussion Task: Students will discuss the texts in depth with their teacher and their classmates, performing activities that result in an examination of the historical question posed. The goal is to foster student confidence when encountering complex text and to reinforce the skills they have acquired regarding how to build and extend their understanding of a text. A general principle is to always reread the passage that provides evidence for the question under discussion. This gives students another encounter with the text, helping them develop fluency and reinforcing their use of text evidence.

Writing Task: Students will write an argument using their understanding of the word choice and emotions expressed in the selection to present their opinions about who was responsible for the Cold War. Teachers might afford students the opportunity to revise their arguments after participating in classroom discussion or receiving teacher feedback, allowing them to refashion both their understanding of the texts and their expression of that understanding.

Outline of Lesson Plan: This lesson can be delivered in a week of instruction and reflection on the part of students and their teacher.

Summative Assessment

Some historians argue that the Cold War began because of Soviet aggression followed by American containment policies. Other historians contend that it was America who was aggressive and the Soviets who reacted to protect their interests.

Considerations:

What is your evaluation of these two positions? What evidence do you have to support your claim? Which of these documents in this unit do you believe is most trustworthy? Why? What other evidence would you need to strengthen your claim?

Writing Task:

Citing evidence from the various texts read in this unit, write an argument in which you select and defend a position on who was primarily responsible for the Cold War.

Your essay will be scored on how well you:

- demonstrate an understanding of the impact of the ideological differences and other factors that contributed to the Cold War and on the broader scope of American History
- state and support your thesis with information from the readings
- provide at least four examples from the readings to support your thesis statement
- present your essay in a logical and well organized manner
- use textual evidence from each reading to support your ideas
- use proper punctuation, spelling, and grammar

See attached rubric for further guidance.

SAMPLE TEACHING TASK RUBRIC (ARGUMENTATION)

Scoring Elements	Not Yet		Approaches Expectations		Meets Expectations		Advanced
	1	1.5	2	2.5	3	3.5	4
Focus	Attempts to address prompt, but lacks focus or is off-task.		Addresses prompt appropriately and establishes a position, but focus is uneven.		Addresses prompt appropriately and maintains a clear, steady focus. Provides a generally convincing position.		Addresses all aspects of prompt appropriately with a consistently strong focus and convincing position.
Controlling Idea	Attempts to establish a claim, but lacks a clear purpose. (L2) Makes no mention of counter claims.		Establishes a claim. (L2) Makes note of counter claims.		Establishes a credible claim. (L2) Develops claim and counter claims fairly.		Establishes and maintains a substantive and credible claim or proposal. (L2) Develops claims and counter claims fairly and thoroughly.
Reading/ Research	Attempts to reference reading materials to develop response, but lacks connections or relevance to the purpose of the prompt.		Presents information from reading materials relevant to the purpose of the prompt with minor lapses in accuracy or completeness.		Accurately presents details from reading materials relevant to the purpose of the prompt to develop argument or claim.		Accurately and effectively presents important details from reading materials to develop argument or claim.
Development	Attempts to provide details in response to the prompt, but lacks sufficient development or relevance to the purpose of the prompt. (L3) Makes no connections or a connection that is irrelevant to argument or claim.		Presents appropriate details to support and develop the focus, controlling idea, or claim, with minor lapses in the reasoning, examples, or explanations. (L3) Makes a connection with a weak or unclear relationship to argument or claim.		Presents appropriate and sufficient details to support and develop the focus, controlling idea, or claim. (L3) Makes a relevant connection to clarify argument or claim.		Presents thorough and detailed information to effectively support and develop the focus, controlling idea, or claim. (L3) Makes a clarifying connection(s) that illuminates argument and adds depth to reasoning.
Organization	Attempts to organize ideas, but lacks control of structure.		Uses an appropriate organizational structure for development of reasoning and logic, with minor lapses in structure and/or coherence.		Maintains an appropriate organizational structure to address specific requirements of the prompt. Structure reveals the reasoning and logic of the argument.		Maintains an organizational structure that intentionally and effectively enhances the presentation of information as required by the specific prompt. Structure enhances development of the reasoning and logic of the argument.
Conventions	Attempts to demonstrate standard English conventions, but lacks cohesion and control of grammar, usage, and mechanics. Sources are used without citation.		Demonstrates an uneven command of standard English conventions and cohesion. Uses language and tone with some inaccurate, inappropriate, or uneven features. Inconsistently cites sources.		Demonstrates a command of standard English conventions and cohesion, with few errors. Response includes language and tone appropriate to the audience, purpose, and specific requirements of the prompt. Cites sources using appropriate format with only minor errors.		Demonstrates and maintains a well-developed command of standard English conventions and cohesion, with few errors. Response includes language and tone consistently appropriate to the audience, purpose, and specific requirements of the prompt. Consistently cites sources using appropriate format.
Content Understanding	Attempts to include disciplinary content in argument, but understanding of content is weak; content is irrelevant, inappropriate, or inaccurate.		Briefly notes disciplinary content relevant to the prompt; shows basic or uneven understanding of content; minor errors in explanation.		Accurately presents disciplinary content relevant to the prompt with sufficient explanations that demonstrate understanding.		Integrates relevant and accurate disciplinary content with thorough explanations that demonstrate in-depth understanding.

Source: <http://www.literacydesigncollaborative.org/resources/module-development-tools/>